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ABSTRACT 
The emergence of various technologies has since pushed researchers to develop new protocols that 
support high density data transmissions in Wide Area Networks. Many of these protocols are TCP 
protocol variants, which have demonstrated better performance in simulation and several limited network 
experiments but have limited practical applications because of implementation and installation 
difficulties. On the other hand, users who need to transfer bulk data (e.g., in grid/cloud computing) 
usually turn to application level solutions where these variants do not fair well. Among protocols 
considered in the application level solutions are UDP-based protocols, such as UDT (UDP-based Data 
Transport Protocol) for cloud /grid computing. Despite the promising development of protocols like 
UDT, what remains to be a major challenge that current and future network designers face is to achieve 
survivability and security of data and networks. Our previous research surveyed various security 
methodologies which led to the development of a framework for UDT. In this paper we present lower-
level security by introducing an Identity Packet (IP) and Authentication Option (AO) for UDT.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many TCP protocol variants have demonstrated better performance in simulation and several 
limited network experiments [19]. However, practical use in real applications of these protocols 
is still very limited because of the implementation and installation difficulties. On the other 
hand, users who need to transfer bulk data (e.g., in grid/cloud computing) usually turn to 
application level solutions where these variants do not fair well. Among protocols considered in 
the application level solutions are UDP-based protocols, such as UDT (UDP-based Data 
Transport Protocol).  
 
UDT is considered one of the most recently developed new transport protocols with congestion 
control algorithms. It was developed to support next generation high-speed networks, including 
wide area optical networks. It is considered a state-of-the-art protocol, which promptly 
addresses various infrastructure requirements for transmitting data in high-speed networks. Its 
development, however, creates new vulnerabilities because like many other protocols, it is 
designed to rely solely on existing security mechanisms for existing protocols such as the 
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Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). Some of these 
security mechanisms cannot be used to absolutely protect UDT, just as security mechanisms 
devised for wired networks cannot be used to protect unwired ones. Both the recently developed 
UDT and the decades-old TCP/UDP lack a well-thought-out security architecture that addresses 
problems in today’s networks.  
 
In this paper, we extend our previous works [7-13] and introduce additional approaches that can 
further assist network and security investigators, designers, and users who consider and 
incorporate security in the important layers when implementing UDT across wide area 
networks. These can support security architectural designs of UDP-based protocols as well as 
assist in the future development of other state-of-the-art fast data transfer protocols.   
  
1.1 Background 
 
The emergence of advanced high speed networks has created opportunities for new technologies 
to prosper. From mobile to wireless and network heterogeneous systems, issues of speed and 
performance may finally be addressed. However, due to the limitations of today’s network 
protocols, it is difficult to scale data intensive applications from local clusters and metropolitan 
area networks to wide area networks. Many existing solutions are built around the existing 
constraints of existing mature protocols, such as TCP/IP. 
 
Recent developments in network research introduced UDT, considered to be one of the next 
generation of high performance UDP- data transfer protocols [10]. UDT introduces a new three-
layer protocol architecture that is composed of a connection flow multiplexer, enhanced 
congestion control, and resource management. The UDT design allows protocol to be shared by 
parallel connections and to be used by future connections. It improves congestion control and 
reduces connection set-up time. 
 
It provides [8,9,10,11] better usability by supporting a variety of network environments and 
application scenarios [8,9,10,11]. It addresses TCP’s limitations by reducing the overhead 
required to send and receive streams of data. 
 
The choice of UDT in this paper is significant for several reasons: UDT as a newly designed 
next generation protocol is considered one of the most promising and fastest protocols ever 
created that operates either on top of the UDP or IP. It is a reliable UDP based application level 
data transport protocol for distributed data intensive applications over wide area and optical 
high-speed networks.  
 
 
1.2 UDT Fast Data Transfer Protocol 
 
UDT is a UDP-based approach [12] and is considered to be the only UDP-based protocol that 
employs a congestion control algorithm targeting shared networks. It is a new application level 
protocol with support for user-configurable control algorithms and more powerful APIs. It has 
no security mechanism to protect itself from adversaries [12,19]. 
 
1.2.1 Packet Structures 
 
UDT is designed to have two packet structures: data packets and control packets. The packets 
are distinguished by the first bit (flag bit) of the packet header. The data packet header starts 
with 0, while the control packet header starts with 1 (fig. 1) [19]. 
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Figure. 1: UDT packet header structures [19]. The first bit of the packet header is a flag 
indicating if this is a data or control packet. Data packets contain a 31-bit sequence number, 29-
bit message number, and a 32-bit time stamp. Conversely, for control packet headers bits 1-15 
are the packet type information and bits 16 -31 can be used for user-defined types. The detailed 
control information depends on the packet type. 
 
 
The packet sequence number uses 31 bits after the flag bit. It uses packet-based sequencing, 
which means the sequence number is increased by 1 for each data packet sent. The sequence 
number is wrapped after it is increased to the maximum number (231 -1) [7,12,19]. 
 
As in other protocols such as DCCP, the sequence number is used to arrange packets into 
sequence in order to detect loss [2,19] and network duplicates; it is also used to protect against 
attackers, half-open connections, and delivery of very old packets. Every packet carries a 
sequence number. Most packet types include an acknowledgment number, which is carried in a 
control packet – the second packet structure of UDT. The control packet is parsed according to 
the structure if the flag bit of a UDT packet is 1. 
 
UDT sequence numbers are data packet based. Like TCP, they are generated by each endpoint 
increased by 1. Both data and control packets that do not carry user data increment the sequence 
number. UDT is not a true reliable protocol as there are no real retransmissions. Even if there 
were, retransmissions of data packets would also predictably increment the sequence number 
[2]. However, this allows UDT implementations to include features such as detecting network 
duplications, retransmissions, and loss. 
 
Another characteristic of UDT is that it is a connection-oriented duplex protocol that supports 
data streaming and partial reliable messaging. It also uses rate-based congestion control (rate 
control) and window-based flow control to regulate outgoing traffic. This was designed so that 
the rate control updates the packet-sending period at constant intervals, whereas the flow control 
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updates the flow window size each time an acknowledgment packet is received. This protocol 
has been expanded to satisfy further requirements for both network research and applications 
development. This expansion is called Composable UDT and was designed to complement the 
kernel space network stacks. However, this feature is intended for the following: 
 
 
• Implementation and deployment of new control algorithms;  
• Data transfer through private links that are implemented using Composable 
         UDT; 
• Supporting application-aware algorithms through Composable UDT; and 
• Ease of testing new algorithms for kernel space when using Composable UDT  
          compared to modifying an OS kernel. 
 
The Composable UDT library implements a standard TCP Congestion Control Algorithm 
(CTCP). CTCP can be redefined to implement more TCP variants, such as TCP (low-based) and 
TCP (delay-based). The designers [19] emphasised that the Composable UDT library does not 
implement the same mechanisms in the TCP specification. TCP uses byte-based sequencing, 
whereas UDT uses packet-based sequencing. The designers stressed that this does not prevent 
CTCP from simulating TCP’s congestion avoidance behaviour [7-13]. 
 
UDT was designed with the Configurable Congestion Control (CCC) interface, which is 
composed of four categories. The designers [19] included: 1) control event handler callbacks; 2) 
protocol behaviour configuration; 3) packet extension; and 4) performance monitoring. 
 
As shown in Table 1 (Appendix), UDT’s services/features can be used for bulk data transfer and 
streaming data processing. TCP cannot be used for this type of processing because it has two 
problems. First, the link must be clean (little packet loss) for it to fully utilize the bandwidth. 
Second, when two TCP streams start at the same time, a stream will be starved due to the RTT 
bias problem; thus, the data analysis process will have to wait for the slower data stream.  
 
Moreover, UDT can offer streaming video to many clients. It can also provide selective 
streaming for each client when required, but its data reliability control needs to be handled by 
the application since UDP, which it operates on, cannot send data at a fixed rate. 
 
1.2.2 UDT Implementation  
 
One example of the implementation of UDT is the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS) project 
[40,44], which is mapping in detail one quarter of the entire sky, determining the positions and 
brightness of more than 300 million celestial objects. It measures distances to more than a 
million galaxies and quasars. The data from the SDSS project so far has increased to 13 
terabytes and continues to grow and transmitted across Australia, Japan, South Korea, and 
China [19].  
 
Securing data during its operations across network layers is therefore imperative in ensuring 
UDT itself is protected when implemented. The challenge to achieve   confidentiality, data 
integrity, and privacy for communication links and the challenge to address the complexity of 
running streaming applications over the Internet and through wireless and mobile devices, 
continue to mount.    
 
In our previous works we presented a framework which adequately addresses vulnerability 
issues by implementing security mechanisms in UDT while maintaining transparency in data 
delivery. The development of the framework was based on the analyses drawn from the source 
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codes of UDT found at SourceForge.net. The source codes were analyzed and tested on Win32 
and Linux environments to gain a better understanding on the functions and characteristics of 
this new protocol.       
 
Network and security simulations tools such as NS2 [31], EMIST [32], and proprietarily 
developed vulnerability testing tools were used to perform various simulation and experiments. 
Most of the security vulnerability tests, however, were conducted through simple penetration 
and traffic load tests. Tests were also performed on simulated environment running IPSec and 
developed simple solutions using Kerberos to test the method.  
 
The results found in [10,11] provided significant groundwork in the development of a 
methodology which composes a variety of mechanisms to secure UDT against various 
adversaries, such as Sybil, addresses, man-in-the-middle and the most common, DoS attacks.  
1.2.3   Unsecured UDT  
UDT is at the application layer or on top of UDP. Subsequently data that it carries are required 
to be transmitted securely and correctly by each application. 
 
UDT implementations are based on generic libraries [19] and through the its five application-
dependent components, such as the API module, the sender, receiver, and UDP channel, as well 
as four data components: sender’s protocol buffer, receiver’s protocol buffer, sender’s loss list 
and receiver’s loss list, require that UDT security features must be implemented on an 
application basis [9,10,12].       
 
The contention, therefore, for the need of security mechanisms of the new UDT is moreover 
derived from four important observations [2,7-13,19]. 
  
• Absence of an inherent security mechanism, such as checksum for UDT 
• Dependencies on user preferences and implementation on the layer on which it is 
implemented 
• Dependencies on existing security mechanisms of other layers on the stack 
• Dependencies on TCP/UDP which are dependent on nodes and their addresses for high 
speed data transfer protocol leading to a number of attacks such as neighborhood, Sybil 
and DoS (Denial of Service) attacks 
 
We contend the need to minimize its sending rates [7-11] in retransmissions, and to introduce its 
own checksum and Identity Packet (IP), and Authentication Option (AO) in its design.  
 
This paper support the importance of implementing security in UDT, however, the introduction 
of other security mechanisms to secure UDT is presented to address its vulnerabilities to 
adversaries exploiting the application, transport, and IP layers.  
 
1.3 Related Works 
 
We  [8-13] presented a security framework highlighting the need to secure UDT and its existing 
features in comparison to TCP and UDP (Appendix table 1). The work focuses on UDT’s 
position in the layer architecture which provides a layer-to-layer approach to addressing security 
(see figures 1 and 2). Its implementation relies on proven security mechanisms developed and 
implemented on existing mature protocols. 
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Figure 1: UDT in Layer Architecture.  UDT is in the application layer above UDP. The application exchanges its data 
through UDT socket, which then uses UDP socket to send or receive data [7-13]. 
 
A summary of these security mechanisms and their implementations are presented in fig. 2. 
  
 
 
Figure 2. : UDT in Layer Architecture.  UDT is in the application layer above UDP. The application exchanges its 
data through UDT socket, which then uses UDP socket to send or receive data .  
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1.4 Contributions 
 
Past investigations [10,12] yield a developed practical and unified approach to securing UDT. 
The results make our approach attainable for other future protocols. We have used existing but 
novel methods for UDT and conducted experimentally-validated characterisations of UDT 
behaviours and its Socket API. 
 
The proposed approaches are useful in several ways. They are presented to support future 
protocol implementations, and provided as a basis for design of both lower and higher-level 
communication layers and in the development of new protocols. To the best of our knowledge 
our contributions to UDT security is first in the literature. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY  
 
A comprehensive overview of the basic security mechanisms [7,8,9,12] for UDT was presented 
and as the research progressed, the introduction of additional set of methods in securing UDT 
was presented, ranging from securing UDT from the IP/Network Layers to the Transport and 
Application Layers.   
 
The following methods are introduced. Firstly, utilizing IPsec (RFC 2401); however, for a 
number of reasons, this is only suitable for some applications [3,18]. Secondly, designing a 
custom security mechanism on the application layer using API, such as GSS-API [12,43], or a 
custom security mechanism on IP layer, such as HIP-CGA [1,21,23,38], or SASL[28]. Thirdly, 
integrating DTLS [16,35] on the transport layer, and lastly, which this paper proposes is the 
introduction of UDT Identity Packet and Authentication Option –AO. 
 
The following are so far the approaches presented that are significant for application and 
transport layer- based authentication and end-to-end security for UDT. They are as follows: 
 
2.1 IP layer 
 
• Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [38] 
• Self-certifying addresses using CGA [1] 
• HIP+CGA [1,21,23,38] 
• IPsec – IP security [3] 
 
2.2 Session/Application and Transport Layers 
 
• GSS-API - Generic Security Service Application  Program Interface [1,21,23,38] 
• UDT-AO – Authentication Option 
• SASL - Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [28] 
• DTLS – Data Transport Layer Security [16,35] 
 
[7-13] presented an overview on securing UDT implementations in various layers. However 
securing UDT in application and other layers needs to be explored in future UDT deployments 
in various applications.  
 
There are application and transport layer-based authentication and end-to-end [12] security 
options for UDT. It is advocated the use of GSS-API in UDT in the development of an 
application using TCP/UDP. The use of Host Identity Protocol (HIP), a state of the art protocol, 
combined with Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) is explored to solve the 
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problems of address-related attacks. We presented a comprehensive review for each approach in 
our previous works [7-13]. 
 
In this paper, two approaches are introduced: (1) Identity Packet and (2) Authentication Option 
for UDT.    
 
3.  APPROACHES 
 
3.1 Identity Packet within UDT 
 
It was proposed [21,23] that the first packet of interaction should carry identity information. In 
today’s Internet, the first packet (e.g. the TCP SYN) carries no higher-level data that provides 
adequate sender’s information. On the initial transmission, it only carries the source IP address 
(network layer) and an initial sequence number (transport layer). The high-level data can be 
only exchanged or transmitted only after the complete ACK has been instantiated. 
Consequently, the receivers will not be able to establish from whom the data is coming from 
without using additional overhead. 
 
UDT like TCP, contains no data which can be used to identify a user (except such information 
is contained within the (unencrypted) data part of the packet).  While, the source and destination 
ports (TCP/UDP) in cooperation with the IP address of the sender and receiver can identify both 
participating parties [14,15,39] in the lower level, it carries no higher-level data that can identify 
the source before an application processes the packets received.  
 
Network protocols, such as UDT, has a Sequence number field that provides identification, 
however, the initial value is determined by the implementer how the initial sequence number is 
chosen (e.g., randomly). The same is true for instance for the Window field used for congestion 
control. As the congestion control has a key influence on the overall performance of the 
protocol, many attempts to optimize them are done e.g., by operating system manufactures.  
 
The lack of identity at the lower-level (network layer) in the existing network protocols has 
made achieving network security difficult. Several protocols developed and implemented on top 
of transport and IP layers usually created overhead and network incompatibilities. The 
development of a new technology that includes identity directly into the packets while retaining 
backward compatibility to allow an identity based approach to network security is a challenge. 
This has been introduced through placing encrypted and digitally signed identity information 
into the packets by developing applications that become part of the stack that add digitally 
signed identity information to the packets and decode the information of any incoming 
connection attempts. 
 
For UDT to be utilized in tomorrow’s Internet it has to accommodate higher-level data 
association while maintaining its dependency on the low-level protocol such as TCP and UDP. 
In other works [14,15] the initial packet of any association, which is called the rendezvous 
packet [15], carries high-level information to initiate the association. This provides the receiving 
entity the information on which it can decide on whether to process the first packet of an 
association.  This information can be delivered in a reliable manner , through cryptographically 
protecting it prior and during the transmission[15].  
 
A mechanism for “first packet identity” (see figure 3)  within UDT should be devised that is 
robust enough that a receiver cannot be flooded by requests that require to take excessive action 
before they have verified the identity and trust at the application level. This information can be 
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created using user-defined types field + information.  It is possible to delegate this decision-
making based on the first packet identity to a guard machine that can take on the burden and risk 
of overload from suspect sources. 
Message
Application Layer
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                     UDT Socket 
     OS Socket Interface
Src addr, Dest addr, Chksm
Src IP, Dest IP, Chksm ,TTL
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Figure 3. First packet Identity in UDT in Layer Architecture. The application exchanges its data through 
UDT socket, which then uses UDP socket to send or receive data through an encrypted mechanism. 
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UDT needs to build on the identity representation that is used at the application level, because 
that may not be visible to the routes (e.g., it might be encrypted see figure 4), it may reveal too 
many attributes of the user, and it may not be associated with each transmission unit 
(applications may be willing to install more state than routers are). It needs to be robust to deal 
with resource usage and flooding attacks. 
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Figure 4. Conceptual design of UDT flow using end-to-end security. First  packet identity is transmitted 
through IPsec[23]. 
3.2    UDT Option for Message Authentication  
 
In this section ,we introduce a mechanism – UDT-Authentication Option (AO) to secure UDT -
a new UDP-based data transport protocol. We describe this mechanism through the introduction 
of UDT extension to achieve security. We evaluate UDT-AO through the use of existing 
message authenticity for other protocols such as TCP. We review existing message protection 
that can act like a signature for UDT segment incorporating information known only to the 
connection end points. Since UDT is operating on UDP for high speed data transfer, we propose 
the creation of a new option in UDT that can significantly reduce the danger of attacks on 
applications running UDT. This can maintain message integrity during data transmissions on 
high speed networks. 
 
We propose the creation of an UDT-AO option which will be added with the UDP checksum. 
UDT is a connection oriented protocol. As such, it needs to include an OPTION for 
authentication when it is used in data transmission. This is because its connections like TCP, are 
likely to be spoofed [41].   
     
In TCP, this option is part of the options (0-44 bytes) that occupy space at the end of the TCP 
header.  In utilising the option in TCP [18], this needs to be enabled in the socket. A few 
systems support this option, which is identified as TCP_MD5SIG option. Note: for the purpose 
of conceptual analysis, we use MD5 in this paper. 
 
int opt = 1;  Enabling this option  
setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG, &opt, sizeof(opt)); 
 
Additionally, the option is included in the checksum. The option may begin on any byte 
boundary, and the header must be padded with zeros to make the header length a multiple of 32 
bits.   
 
Better authentication options in TCP are in progress to address the collision issue in MD5 
[25,34].  However in this paper, the primary motivation is to initially introduce an option to 
allow UDT to protect itself against the introduction of spoofed segments into the connection 
stream, regardless what authentication schemes required in a given number of bytes. This 
option, like in TCP, will be included in the UDP header. 
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UDT is in user space above the network transport layer of UDP, it is dependent on UDP where 
this option is not available, thus becomes a challenge in its implementation. UDT, however, 
provides transport functionalities to applications.  
  
To spoof a connection of UDT, an attacker would not only have to guess UDT’s sequence 
numbers, but would also have had to obtain the password included in the MD5 digest. This 
password never appears in the connection stream, and the actual form of the password is up to 
the application, according to RFC 2385. It could during the lifetime of a particular connection 
so long as this change was synchronised on both ends (although retransmission can become 
problematical in some implementations with changing passwords). 
  
To utilize this option in UDT, similar to TCP this needs to be enabled in the socket. A few 
systems support this option, which can be identified as UDT_MD5SIG  or in the case of using 
SHA, UDT_SHASIG option.  
 
 
int opt = 1;  Enabling this option  
setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_UDT, UDT_MD5SIG, &opt, sizeof(opt)); 
 
Likewise, the option is included in the UDP checksum. However, there is no negotiation for the 
use of this option in a connection (also in TCP) rather it is purely a matter of site policy whether 
or not its connections use the option. 
 
3.2.1 Syntax for UDT Option 
 
The proposed option can be applied on type 2 of the UDT header. This field is reserved to 
define specific control packets in the Composable UDT framework.  
 
Every segment sent on a UDT connection to be protected against spoofing will similarly contain 
the 16-byte MD5 digest produced by applying the MD5 algorithm to these items in the 
following similar order required for TCP : 
 
1.  UDP pseudo header  (Source and Destination IP       addresses, port number, and  segment    
     length) 
 
2.  UDT header + UDP (Sequence number and timestamp), and assuming a UDP  checksum       
     zero 
 
3.   UDT control packet or segment data (if any) 
 
4. Independently-specified key or password, known to both UDTs and presumably 
connection-specific and 
 
5.   Connection key 
 
The UDT packet header and UDP pseudo-header are in network byte order. The nature of the 
key is deliberately left unspecified, but it must be known by both ends of the connection, similar 
with TCP. A particular UDT implementation will determine what the application may specify as 
the key. 
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To calculate UDP checksum a "pseudo header" is added to the UDP message header. This  
includes: 
 
IP Source Address        4 bytes 
IP Destination Address 4 bytes 
Protocol              2 bytes 
UDP Length              2 bytes 
 
The checksum is calculated over all the octets of the pseudo header, UDP header and data. If the 
data contains an odd number of octets a pad, zero octet is added to the end of data. The pseudo 
header and the pad are not transmitted with the packet.  
 
Upon receiving a signed segment, the receiver must validate it by calculating its own digest 
from the same data (using its own key) and comparing the two digest. A failing comparison 
must result in the segment being dropped and must not produce any response back to the sender. 
Logging the failure is advisable [22]. 
 
Unlike other TCP extensions (e.g., the Window Scale option [RFC1323]), the absence of the 
option in the SYN,ACK segment must not cause the sender to disable its sending of signatures. 
This negotiation is typically done to prevent some TCP implementations from misbehaving 
upon receiving options in non-SYN segments. In UDT it is ACK2 (ACK of ACK). 
 
This is not a problem for this option, according to Heffernan [22], as similarly since the SYN, 
ACK sent during connection negotiation will not be signed and will thus be ignored. This is the 
same with ACK2 for UDT. The connection will never be made, and non-SYN segments (which 
does not exist in UDP) with options will never be sent. More importantly, the sending of 
signatures must be under the complete control of the application, not at the mercy of the remote 
host not understanding the option. 
  
The MD5 digest is always 16 bytes in length, and the option would appear in every 
segment of a connection [22,25,34,42]. 
 
3.2.2 Implications  
 
3.2.2.1  Hashing Algorithm 
 
MD5 algorithm has been found to be vulnerable to collision search attacks, and is considered by 
some to be insufficiently strong for this type of application [22,25,34,42]. 
 
However, we specify the MD5 algorithm for this option as basis of our argument to include AO 
to UDT. Systems that use UDT have been deployed operationally, and there was no "algorithm 
type" field defined to allow an upgrade using the same option number.  
 
This does not, therefore, prevent the deployment of another similar option which uses another 
hashing algorithm (like SHA-1, SHA-256). Moreover, should most implementations pad the 18 
byte option as defined to 20 bytes anyway, it would be just as well to define a new option which 
contains an algorithm type field.   
 
In addressing this implication, we recommend using a more secure message algorithm such as 
SHA-1 or SHA-256.   
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3.2.2.2.    Key configuration 
It should be noted that the key configuration mechanism of routers may restrict the possible 
keys that may be used between peers. It is strongly recommended that an implementation be 
able to support at minimum a key composed of a string of printable ASCII of 80 bytes or less, 
as this is current practice in TCP [34]. 
  
  4. CONCLUSIONS 
New applications vary in traffic and connection characteristics in various communication links. 
Most of them still use TCP for data transfer because of its reliability and stability. Despite being 
widely used, there are a number of serious security flaws inherent in TCP and UDP [2,3,4]. 
There have also been performance issues in the implementation of large networks that require 
high bandwidths. 
 
On the other hand, the current and future Internet has no mechanism to constrain hosts that offer 
and use excess traffic more than the required bandwidths. Particularly, it contains no defense 
against DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks. It does not include an architectural 
approach to protect its own elements from any attack [15]. Its existing link encryption may be 
sufficient and efficient for securing connectivity but not securing the Internet per se. The link 
encryption can also create network and application incompatibilities.   
In this paper, we introduced ‘first packet identity’ which needs to be instituted but devised in 
such as way that it is robust enough that a receiver cannot be flooded by requests that require the 
receiver to take excessive action before they have verified the identity and trust at the 
application level.   
 
We also introduced and proposed a state-of-the-art security mechanism for UDT and for its 
future implementations to various network topologies by adding a field for AO, authentication 
options.   We demonstrated the use of MD5 [25], while we encourage the use of other hash 
functions, such as SHA-1 or SHA-256.   
 
The preceding discussions presented in this paper focused on the conceptual low-level 
protection of the end node since UDT relies on TCP and UDP for data delivery. We proposed 
the inclusion of identity on its packet header (IP) and Authentication Option (AO) before the 
transmission is validated at the application level.  
 
Future works include the implementation of the proposed framework [7-13] and  the conceptual 
approach presented in this paper to device an Identity Packet for UDT and introduce 
Authentication Option to protect data transmission. The works will include evaluating other 
existing network protocols in order to adequately secure current and future high speed networks, 
including the Internet.  
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